The End Of Competition
By 1905, industrial corporations employed 71 percent of all wage earners, mining enterprises 10 percent more. At exactly the moment forced-schooling legislation in America was being given its bite by the wholesale use of police, social service investigators, and public exhortation, corporate capitalism boiled up like sulphur in the Monongahela to color every aspect of national life. Corporate spokesmen and academic interpreters, often the same people, frequently explained what was happening as a stage in the evolution of the race. A Johns Hopkins professor writing in 1900 said that what was really happening behind the smokescreen of profit-making was "the sifting out of genius" and "the elimination of the weak."1
The leading patent attorney in the nation speaking in the same year said nothing, including the law, could stem the new tide running, the only realistic course was "acquiescence and adjustment." Charles Willard of Sears & Roebuck was the speaker. Willard suggested the familiar American competitive system "is not necessarily meant for all eternity." Business was wisely overthrowing competitive wastefulness which produced only "panic, overproduction, bad distribution and uncertainty, replacing it with protected privilege for elected producers."2
The principles of the business revolution which gave us schooling are still virtually unknown to the public. Competition was effectively crippled nearly a century ago when, profoundly influenced by doctrines of positivism and scientific Darwinism, corporate innovators like Carnegie and Morgan denounced competition’s evils, urging the mogul class to reconstruct America and then the world, in the cooperative corporate image.3 "Nothing less than the supremacy of the world lies at our feet," said Carnegie prophetically. Adam Smith’s competitive, self-regulating market would be the death of the new economy if not suppressed because it encouraged chronic overproduction.
Henry Holt, the publisher, speaking in 1908, said there was "too much 'enterprise'"[p.9]. The only effective plan was to put whole industries under central control; the school industry was no exception. Excessive overproduction of brains is the root cause of the overproduction of everything else, he said.
James Livingston has written an excellent short account of this rapid social transformation, called Origins of the Federal Reserve System, from which I’ve taken some lessons. Livingston tells us that the very language of proponents of corporate America underwent a radical change at the start of the century. Business decisions began to be spoken of almost exclusively as courses of purposeful social action, not mere profit-seeking. Charles Phillips of the Delaware Trust wrote, for instance, "The banker, the merchant, the manufacturer, and the agent of transportation, must unite to create and maintain that reasonable distribution of opportunity, of advantage, and of profit, which alone can forestall an adjustment that left to itself must needs assume the character of a revolution."[p.61] It hardly requires genius to see how such a directive would play itself out in forced schooling.
In 1900, in his book Corporations and the Public Welfare, James Dill warned that the most critical social question of the day was figuring out how to get rid of the small entrepreneur, yet at the same time retain his loyalty "to a system based on private enterprise"[p.62].4 The small entrepreneur had been the heart of the American republican ideal, the soul of its democratic strength. So the many school training habits which led directly to small entrepreneurship had to be eliminated.
Control of commodity circulation by a few demanded similar control in commodity production. To this end, immediate sanctions were leveled against older practices: first, destruction of skilled worker craft unions which, up to the Homestead steel strike in 1892, had regulated the terms of work in a factory. Inside a decade, all such unions were rendered ineffective with the single exception of the United Mine Workers. Second, professionalization of mental labor to place it under central control also was speedily accomplished through school requirements and licensing legislation.
In the emerging world of corporate Newspeak, education became schooling and schooling education. The positive philosophy freed business philosophers like Carnegie from the tyranny of feeling they had always to hire the best and brightest on their own independent terms for company operations. Let fools continue to walk that dead-end path. Science knew that obedient and faithful executives were superior to brilliant ones. Brains were needed, certainly, but like an excess of capsicum, too much of the mental stuff would ruin the national digestion. One of the main points of the dramatic shift to mass production and mass schooling was to turn Americans into a mass population.
- [Hazard]
From Origins of the Federal Reserve System:
Sidney Sherwood of Johns Hopkins University suggested, for example, that the modern corporation's historic task was to sift out "undertaking genius" from the horde of competitors who fouled the system: "The real function of the trust is to get rid of the weak entrepreneur. It is a natural and spontaneous effort of a progressive industrial organization to get undertaking genius at its head which has produced the trust. The formation of trusts is a process of natural selection of the highest order."[p.58 →]↩
- [Hazard]
Again, from "Origins":
Charles D. Willard of the Los Angeles Board of Trade (later of Sears, Roebuck & Company) was more succinct: "The legislation which was intended to abolish the primary trust [the Sherman Act] has merely driven it into a new and utterly impregnable position." In that case, business would do well to adjust thought to reality and develop a new outlook more in accordance with the facts. As Willard put it, "because we have operated our business affairs under the competitive system from the beginning, that system is not necessarily God-given, for all eternity. Centuries of experience have demonstrated that the panic, over-production, bad distribution and uncertainty of employment are inevitable accompaniments of competition."[p.58 →]↩
- [Hazard]
Though Morgan seems to have had a clear anti-competitive bent, I don't think Carnegie rolled that way. He was more old-school crush the competition beneath your feet and grind their bones to dust type of guy. He was notorious for entering anti-competitive pool agreements with other business and then breaking them when he felt like it and costing the other members huge sums. In his essay, The Bugaboo of Trusts he explains the logic of trusts and how in practice they are continually undermined when their temporarily increased profits attract new competition that they can't adequately respond to:
The people of America can smile at the efforts of all her railway magnates and of all her manufacturers to defeat the economic laws by Trusts or combinations, or pools, or "differentials," or anything of like character. Only let them hold firmly to the doctrine of free competition. Keep the field open. Freedom for all to engage in railroad building when and where capital desires, subject to conditions open to all. Freedom for all to engage in any branch of manufacturing under like conditions.[p.21 →]
Now, it would be reasonable to wonder if Carnegie is just lying about trusts being ineffective and nothing to worry about. The book The Triumph of Conservatism presents data that seems to indicate trusts were in fact failing to control their respective industries and bar new entrants during the 1890's and 1900's, and only started succeeding after a lot of new regulatory institutions come into being across the WWI years.↩
- [Hazard]
"Corporations and the Public Welfare" is the name of a the document which has the speeches that were given at some business conference, where James Dill gave a speech called Industrials as Investments for Small Capital.↩